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We study the robustness of flow networks against cascading failures under a partial load redis-
tribution model. In particular, we consider a flow network of N lines with initial loads L1, . . . , LN
and free-spaces (i.e., redundant space) S1, . . . , SN that are independent and identically distributed
with joint distribution PLS(x, y) = P [L ≤ x, S ≤ y]. The capacity Ci is the maximum load allowed
on line i, and is given by Ci = Li + Si. When a line fails due to overloading, it is removed from
the system and (1 − ε)-fraction of the load it was carrying is redistributed equally among all re-
maining lines in the system. The rest (i.e., ε-fraction) of the load is assumed to be lost or absorbed,
e.g., due to advanced circuitry disconnecting overloaded power lines or an inter-connected network
or material absorbing a fraction of the flow from overloaded lines. We analyze the robustness of
this flow network against random attacks that remove a p-fraction of the lines. Our contributions
include (i) deriving the final fraction of alive lines n∞(p, ε) for all p, ε ∈ (0, 1) and confirming the
results via extensive simulations; (ii) showing that partial redistribution might lead to (depending
on the parameter 0 < ε ≤ 1) the order of transition at the critical attack size p⋆ changing from
first to second-order; and (iii) proving analytically that flow networks achieve maximum robustness
(quantified by the area
∫
1
0
n∞(p, ε)dp) when all lines have the same free-space regardless of their
initial load. The optimality of equal free-space allocation is also confirmed on real-world data from
the UK National Power Grid.
PACS numbers: 64.60.Ht, 62.20.M-, 89.75.-k, 02.50.-r
I. INTRODUCTION
Flow network abstractions have been extensively used
to analyze complex phenomena occurring in power line
networks, financial networks, transportation networks
and biological ecosystems. Current trends in techno-
logical development such as online social media, cyber-
physical systems and the internet of things have enabled
a plethora of new applications involving dynamical inter-
actions over and within flow networks. In this respect,
current research on networks covers phenomena such as
information dissemination and influence propagation [1–
5], percolation [6–11] and robustness [12–17].
This paper focuses on the robustness of flow networks.
In particular, we are interested in understanding the how
the random failure of a fraction lines might trigger fail-
ures of other lines leading to what has been identified in
the literature as cascading failures. Real life phenomena
such as blackouts in power networks [18] and crises in
financial networks [19] occur as a consequence of failures
that follow one after the other. Consequently, under-
standing the possible mechanisms of such failures is of
paramount importance; e.g., see [20]. The robustness of
flow network structures against cascading failures is an
active research topic and has received recent interest from
many researchers [12, 13, 15]. For example, [21–25] con-
sider power networks where the failure mechanism is the
equal redistribution of load upon the failure of a power
line. We consider a similar phenomenon in flow networks.
In particular, we build our analysis upon the well known
fiber bundle model [26]. Fiber bundle models have been
used in a wide range of applications including fatigue [27],
failure of composite materials [28] and landslides [29].
Flow networks typically include built-in systems to
counter cascade formations and alleviate the spread of
the adverse effect of failures over other lines in the net-
work [17]. In this paper, our objective is to obtain a
unified understanding of cascading failures for networks
with a specific mechanism to counter such failures. In
particular, we study the robustness under partial load re-
distribution in a democratic fiber bundle-like model. Our
problem setting is as follows: We consider N lines whose
initial loads L1, . . . , LN and free-spaces S1, . . . , SN have
joint distribution PLS(x, y) = P [L ≤ x, S ≤ y] and are
independent and identically distributed along lines. The
maximum flow allowed on a line i defines its capacity,
and is given by Ci = Li + Si. When a line fails due to
overloading, it is removed from the system and (1 − ε)-
fraction of the load it was carrying (at the moment of
failing) gets redistributed equally among all remaining
lines in the system; hence we refer to this as the partial
load redistribution model. The rest (i.e., ε-fraction) of
the load is assumed to be lost or absorbed, e.g., due to
advanced circuitry disconnecting overloaded power lines
or an inter-connected network/material absorbing a frac-
tion of the flow from overloaded lines. Throughout the
paper, we refer to ε as the loss or absorption factor, in-
terchangeably.
We study the robustness of the flow network described
above against random attacks or failures. In particular,
we develop a complete analytic framework that unravels
the dynamics of cascading failures initiated by a random
attack removing a p-fraction of the lines. This is done
by computing recursively the fraction of surviving lines
and the additional load distributed to each surviving line
2at every step of the cascade. We show how these recur-
sive relations can be utilized to derive the final fraction
n∞(p, ε) of alive lines, under any attack size 0 < p < 1
and any absorption factor ε ∈ (0, 1). These results are
also confirmed through an extensive numerical study.
An interesting observation from our results concerns
the order of phase transition that the system exhibits at
the critical attack size p⋆; this is the smallest attack size
p that collapses the entire system. It is widely known
[23, 26] that flow networks exhibit only first-order phase
transitions; this phenomenon is referred to as the abrupt
rupture in the context of fiber bundles. However, we show
in this paper that under the partial redistribution model,
the order of the phase transition might be first or second
order depending on the absorption factor ε. In particu-
lar, we demonstrate that the order of the phase transition
changes from first to second-order after ε exceeds a cer-
tain tricritical point. This is reminiscent of the behavior
observed in percolation studies of inter-connected net-
works [6], where reducing the coupling strength between
two inter-connected networks might lead to a second-
order transition [30].
Utilizing the analytic framework we developed, we then
seek to answer a very fundamental question concerning
flow networks: Under given constraints on the total load
and capacity available to N lines, how should these be
allocated so that the resulting flow network has the max-
imum possible robustness against random attacks. This
question is particularly challenging under the partial flow
redistribution model owing to the fact that the system’s
robustness may not be fully characterized by the critical
attack size p⋆. Simply put, it is possible for an allocation
to lead to a large p⋆ but a very poor performance (in
terms of final system size n∞(p, ε)) for even small attack
sizes p. In order to meaningfully asses the robustness of
a flow network under attacks of all possible scale, we thus
consider the robustness metric proposed in [31] given as
R(ǫ) :=
∫ 1
0
n∞(p, ε)dp
It can be seen that R(ǫ) measures the area that falls
under the curve n∞(p, ε) as p varies from zero to one.
More importantly, R(ǫ) gives the mean fraction of lines
that will survive an attack whose size p is random over
(0, 1).
Although it is often very difficult (if not impossible)
to analytically prove optimality results for any network
property, here we are able to give a complete mathemati-
cal proof showing how the robustness metric R(ǫ) can be
maximized. In particular, we show that for a given total
initial load and capacity to be allocated to N lines, ro-
bustness R(ǫ) is maximized when all lines have the same
free-space, i.e., capacity minus initial load, regardless of
how the initial loads are allocated. This result is shown
to hold under any absorption factor 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1.
The optimality of equal free-space allocation (in the
sense of maximizing robustness) in flow networks is in-
teresting for several reasons. In particular, it shows that
the widely used [32–35] assumption that line capacity is a
fixed proportion of its load (e.g., by setting Ci = (1+α)Li
with α defining the tolerance factor used for all N lines)
leads to sub-optimal robustness. In fact, our result shows
that in order to maximize robustness, lines with higher
initial load should be given a smaller tolerance factor (i.e.,
free-space divided by load). Moreover, our results show
that although a flow network’s robustness might be im-
proved by increasing its capability to absorb failed load
(which often will require a more expensive or complicated
design), the system can be made optimally robust by al-
locating all lines the same free-space irrespective of the
absorbing capability.
We test the above result under a new cascading failure
model for flow networks that combine local and global re-
distribution approaches; e.g., a portion of the failed load
is redistributed in the local neighborhood according to
network topology while the rest is redistributed globally.
For this model, we provide simulation results that sug-
gest that the mean-field redistribution model analyzed
here captures the qualitative behavior of system robust-
ness well. In particular, we observe that uniformly al-
locating free-spaces promises to be optimal also in this
more general setting where (part of the) failed load gets
redistributed locally according to a network topology.
Finally, we test our optimality result on real-world sys-
tems. In particular, we run numerical experiments using
the UK National Grid data available in [36]. These ex-
periments confirm our optimality result and suggest that
some real-world systems do not exhibit optimal robust-
ness against random failures. In fact, their robustness
can be improved significantly by re-allocating the total
available capacity in such a way as to ensure that ev-
ery line has the same free-space. We believe that our
results provide interesting insights into the dynamics of
cascading failures in flow networks and call for a careful
examination of the capacity allocations in existing real-
world systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we explain the system model in detail and present the
problem definition. In Section III, we obtain an iterative
dynamical relation for the extra load per alive line at
every stage of the cascading failure process, under general
load and free-space distributions. Section IV is devoted
to numerical results that confirm the main findings of the
paper for systems of finite size. In Section V, we present
a complete analytic framework to establish the optimal
distribution of load and free-space (when mean values
of both are fixed) that leads to maximum robustness.
These findings are confirmed via extensive simulations in
Section VC using synthetic data (with various commonly
used distributions utilized to generate load and free-space
values) as well as real-world data from the UK National
Power Grid. The paper is concluded in Section VI.
3II. MODEL AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
Partial load-redistribution model. We consider
a network with N lines L1, . . . ,LN with initial loads
L1, . . . , LN . The capacity Ci of a line Li defines the
maximum power flow that can be carried by it, and is
expressed as
Ci = Li + Si, i = 1, . . . , N, (1)
where Si denotes the free-space that is assigned to line
Li. Alternatively, the capacity of a line Li can be defined
as a factor of its initial load, i.e.,
Ci = (1 + αi)Li (2)
with αi > 0 denoting its tolerance factor. Accordingly,
the free-space Si is given in terms of the initial load Li as
Si = αiLi. Most existing works assume a fixed tolerance
factor for all lines in the system, i.e., αi = α for all i;
e.g., see [32–35].
The main assumption of our model is that when a line
fails due to overloading, i.e., due to its load exceeding
its capacity, it is removed from the system and (1 − ε)-
fraction of the load it was carrying (at the moment of
failing) gets redistributed equally among all remaining
lines in the system; hence we refer to this as the partial
load redistribution model. The rest (i.e., ε-fraction) of
its load is assumed to be lost or absorbed.
The partial load redistribution model is motivated by
several real-world scenarios. For instance, most real-
world power systems are equipped with advanced protec-
tion circuits that immediately disconnect the overloaded
lines from the rest of the grid [37, 38]; the parameter ε
would then represent the fraction of lines protected by
such advanced circuitry. Alternatively, we can think of
a flow network (resp. a bundle of fibers) that is inter-
connected with another network (resp. material) that can
absorb a fraction of the flow from overloaded lines.
Throughout we assume that the pairs (Li, Si) are in-
dependently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with the
joint distribution PLS(x, y) := P [L ≤ x, S ≤ y] for each
i = 1, . . . , N . The corresponding joint probability den-
sity function is given by pLS(x, y) =
∂2
∂x∂y
PLS(x, y). We
assume that the marginal densities pL(x) and pS(y) are
continuous on their support. Lmin and Smin denote the
minimum values for load L and free-space S, respectively,
throughout the paper. We assume that Lmin, Smin > 0.
Our load redistribution model is intimately related to
the democratic fiber bundle model [22, 23] where N par-
allel fibers with failure thresholds C1, . . . , CN share an
applied total force F equally. In this line of literature, it
has been of interest to study the dynamics of recursive
failures in the bundle as the applied force F increases;
e.g., see [39–41]. This model was used by [21] in the
context of power line networks, with F corresponding to
the total load shared equally by N power lines. See also
[42] for the latest developments on the democratic fiber
bundle model relating to a power line network. The rel-
evance of the equal load-redistribution model for power
systems stems from its relation to Kirchhoff’s law in the
mean-field sense. Our current partial load redistribution
model builds upon that in [42]. Even though our model
involves a global redistribution of a fraction of the extra
load due to line failures, the capability to partially cap-
ture the failures is, in effect, due to the ability to keep
a portion of the extra load due to failed lines in a local
level, possibly in a secondary network. While our current
work does not consider the interaction of local and global
behavior, our framework helps build a step towards this
direction.
Problem definition. Our main goal is to study the
robustness of the flow network under the partial load re-
distribution rule described above. We consider a random
attack or a random failure that leads to p-fraction of the
lines to be removed from the system. We assume that
the load of these initially failed lines are redistributed in
full to the non-attacked lines, with each non-attacked line
receiving an equal portion of the total load failed. Our
motivation in distinguishing these initial failures (result-
ing from an attack) from failures due to overloading of
lines is two-fold. Firstly, in the case of a physical attack
to the system, we would expect any advanced circuitry or
inter-connection to other networks to be damaged along
with the failed lines, making it impossible for ε-fraction
of the failed load to be absorbed. Secondly, this assump-
tion ensures that a random attack against p-fraction of
the lines is equivalent (in the mean-field sense) to a dis-
turbance caused by increasing the initial load of every line
(or, force applied to every fiber) by pE[L]/(1− p). This
in turn enables our analysis to provide insights on the ro-
bustness of the system against both random attacks (as
commonly considered in the context of power systems)
as well as the increase of total applied load or force (as
commonly considered in the context of fiber bundles).
After the initial load redistribution, the amount of load
on each alive line will be given by its initial load plus
its share of the total load of the failed lines. This, in
turn, leads to the failure of additional lines due to the
updated flow exceeding their capacity. In the ensuing
stages of this process, the network is assumed to have the
capability of absorbing (i.e., removing from the system) ε-
fraction of the load from lines who fail due to overloading.
Put differently, if a line Li fails due to its load Li(t)
at time t exceeding its capacity, then only (1 − ε)Li(t)
amount of load will be redistributed, in an equal manner,
to the remaining lines; as mentioned before, the system
is assumed to absorb the portion εLi(t) either by help of
advanced circuitry or by means of shedding that portion
of load.
In the most general scenario for partial redistribution,
we could allow ε to depend on time t and the extra load
incurred per line at that time. However, our main goal
for analysis in this paper is to understand the case when
ε is constant throughout time. The load redistribution
process continues recursively until no further failures oc-
4cur, potentially generating a cascade of failures. Our goal
is to understand the limits associated with this process.
We let n∞(p, ε) denote the final (i.e., steady-state) frac-
tion of alive lines when a p-fraction of lines is randomly
attacked initially; as before ε denotes the fraction of flow
from overloaded lines that will be lost (and thus will not
be redistributed to the remaining lines) at each stage of
the cascade process.
We derive expressions for n∞(p, ε) for all attack sizes
0 < p < 1 and any 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 in order to understand the
robustness of the network under the partial load redistri-
bution model. We will be particularly interested in un-
derstanding the critical attack size p⋆ at which n∞(p, ε)
drops to zero, and in developing design guidelines (in the
sense of choosing the distribution pLS) to optimize net-
work robustness under given constraints.
With regard to the notation in use: Probabilistic state-
ments are made with respect to probability measure P,
and we denote the corresponding expectation operator
by E. The indicator function of an event A is denoted by
1 [A].
III. ANALYTIC RESULTS
In this section, we provide a mean-field analysis for
the cascading failures of lines under the model described
in Section II. We start by deriving recursive relations
concerning the fraction ft of lines that are failed at time
stage t = 0, 1, . . .. The number of links that are still
alive at time t is then given by Nt = N(1 − ft) for all
t = 0, 1, . . .. The cascading failures start with a random
attack that targets a fraction p of lines. Hence, we have
f0 = p. Upon the failure of these f0 lines, their load
will be redistributed to the remaining (1 − f0)N lines,
with each remaining line receiving an equal portion of the
failed load. Since the pN lines that have been attacked
are selected uniformly at random, the mean total load
that will be redistributed to the remaining lines is given
by E [L] pN . The resulting extra load per alive line, Q0,
is thus given by
Q0 =
E [L] pN
(1 − p)N
= E [L]
f0
1− f0
. (3)
In the next stage, a line i that survives the initial at-
tack fails when its new load reaches its capacity. For
convenience, we assume that a line also fails when its
load equals its capacity, i.e., when
Li +Q0 ≥ Li + Si,
or, equivalently Si ≤ Q0. Therefore, at stage t = 1, an
additional fraction P [S ≤ Q0] of the lines that were alive
at the end of stage 0 fail. This yields
f1 = f0 + (1 − f0)P [S ≤ Q0] = 1− (1− f0)P [S > Q0] .
Now, to compute the extra load per alive line at stage
1, which we denote by Q1, we need to sum the total load
of the lines failed precisely at stage 1, multiply it by (1−ε)
to account for the load absorbed or lost as explained in
Section II, divide it by the new system size (1−f1)N and
add this fraction on top of the existing extra load. With
A denoting the initial set of lines attacked, this gives
Q1 = Q0 +
1− ε
(1− f1)N
· E

 ∑
i6∈A:Si≤Q0
(Li +Q0)


= Q0 +
1− ε
(1− f1)N
·
∑
i6∈A
E [(Li +Q0)1 [Si ≤ Q0]]
= Q0 + (1− ε)(1− f0)
E [(L+Q0) · 1 [S ≤ Q0]]
1− f1
,
where the last step uses |A|/N = p = f0.
At the stage t = 2, the following two conditions are
needed for a line to still stay alive: i) it should not have
failed until this stage, which happens with probability
1 − f1 and necessitates its free-space to satisfy S > Q0;
and ii) its free-space should also satisfy S > Q1 so that
its capacity is still larger than its current load. Thus, the
fraction of failures f2 at this stage is given by
f2 = 1− (1− f1)P [S > Q1 | S > Q0] .
On the other hand, we can calculate the total load that
is redistributed to the remaining lines as before:
Q2 = Q1 + (1− ε)(1− f0)
E [(L+Q1) · 1 [Q0 < S ≤ Q1]]
1− f2
.
The form of the recursive equations for each t = 0, 1, . . .
can now be seen to be as follows:
ft+1 = 1− (1− ft)P
[
S > Qt
∣∣∣∣ S > Qt−1
]
Qt+1 = Qt + (1− ε)(1− f0)
E[(L+Qt)·1[Qt−1<S≤Qt]]
1−ft+1
Nt+1 = (1− ft+1)N
(4)
where f0 = p, N0 = N(1 − p), and Q0 = E [L]
p
1−p .
For convenience, we also let Q−1 = 0. From (4) we see
that cascades stop and a steady state is reached, i.e.,
Nt+2 = Nt+1, if
P
[
S > Qt+1
∣∣∣∣ S > Qt
]
= 1. (5)
We now work towards simplifying the recursion on Qt
in order to obtain a better understanding of the condition
(5) needed for cascading failures to stop. To this end, we
apply the first relation in (4) repeatedly to see that
1− ft+1 = (1− ft)P [S > Qt | S > Qt−1]
1− ft = (1− ft−1)P [S > Qt−1 | S > Qt−2]
...
1− f2 = (1− f1)P [S > Q1 | S > Q0]
1− f1 = (1− f0)P [S > Q0] .
5Applying these recursively starting from the last equality,
we find that
1− ft+1 = (1− f0)
t∏
ℓ=0
P [S > Qℓ | S > Qℓ−1] ,
where we set Q−1 = 0 as before. Since Qt is monotone
increasing in t, i.e., Qt+1 ≥ Qt for all t, we further obtain
1− ft+1
= (1− f1)
P [S > Qt]
P [S > Qt−1]
·
P [S > Qt−1]
P [S > Qt−2]
· · ·
P [S > Q1]
P [S > Q0]
= (1− p)P [S > Qt] (6)
This last expression confirms the intuitive result that the
fraction of alive lines at stage t+1 is simply given by the
fraction of lines who survive the initial attack and have
more free-space than the extra load Qt that is distributed
on every alive line at stage t.
Using (6) in (4), it is now understood that the dynam-
ics of cascading failures is fully governed and understood
by the recursions on Qt given by
Qt+1 = Qt + (1− ε)
E [(L +Qt) · 1 [Qt−1 < S ≤ Qt]]
P [S > Qt]
(7)
for each t = 0, 1, . . . (with Q0 given at (3)), with the
condition for reaching the steady-state still being (5). Let
t⋆ be the stage at which steady-state is reached, i.e., the
first t for which (5) holds. Then, the final system sizes
n∞(p, ε) defined as the fraction of alive lines at the steady
state can be computed simply from (viz. (6))
n∞(p, ε) = (1− p)P [S > Qt⋆ ] . (8)
Throughout, we will be particularly interested in the crit-
ical attack size p⋆ defined as the largest attack that the
system can sustain (in the sense of having a positive final
size n∞(p, ε)); i.e., for given ε we let
p⋆(ε) = sup{p > 0 : n∞(p, ε) > 0}
In order to demonstrate the impact of the absorption
factor ε together with the number of stages needed to
reach a steady-state, we find it useful to further simplify
(7). By simple algebra, we get
Qt+1P [S > Qt]
= QtP [S > Qt] + (1− ε)QtP [Qt−1 < S ≤ Qt]
+ (1− ε)E [L · 1 [Qt−1 < S ≤ Qt]]
= QtP [S > Qt−1]− εQtP [Qt−1 < S ≤ Qt]
+ (1− ε)E [L · 1 [Qt−1 < S ≤ Qt]] ,
which is equivalent to the following difference relation on
the sequence Qt+1P [S > Qt]
Qt+1P [S > Qt]−QtP [S > Qt−1] (9)
= (1− ε)E [L1 [Qt−1 < S ≤ Qt]]− εQtP [Qt−1 < S ≤ Qt]
We see from (9) that higher values of ε have suppressing
effect on the growth of Qt, leading to steady-state being
reached faster (i.e., in small number of steps), and with
a larger final system size in view of (8).
It is desirable to obtain a closed-form solution for Qt⋆
by solving the difference equation (8); in view of (8)
this would lead to a closed-form expression for the final
system size n∞(p, ε). However, applying (9) recursively
leads to a telescoping sum given by
Qt+1P [S > Qt]−Q0
= (1 − ε)
t∑
i=0
E [L · 1 [Qi−1 < S ≤ Qi]]
− ε
t∑
i=0
QiP [Qi−1 < S ≤ Qi] (10)
It is now clear that unless ε = 0 or ε = 1, a direct
expression for Qt (for arbitrary t) can not be obtained
without going through the recursion (9) and obtaining
each one of Q1, Q2, . . . , Qt−1. Therefore, it is also not
possible to derive a closed-form expression for Qt⋆ and
n∞(p, ε).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we confirm our theoretical findings via
numerical simulations. We focus on three commonly
known distributions for the load and free-space variables:
i) Uniform, ii) Pareto, and iii) Weibull. The probability
density functions corresponding to these distributions are
given below for a generic random variable L.
1. Pareto Distribution: L ∼ Pareto(Lmin, b). With
Lmin > 0 and b > 0, the support set is x ≥ Lmin
and the density is given by
pL(x) = L
b
minbx
−b−1.
We also enforce b > 1 in order to ensure that
E [L] = bLmin/(b − 1) is finite. The Pareto fam-
ily distributions are also known as power-law dis-
tributions and have been extensively used in many
fields.
2. Uniform Distribution: L ∼ U(Lmin, Lmax). The
support set is Lmin ≤ x ≤ Lmax and the density is
given by
pL(x) =
1
Lmax − Lmin
3. Weibull Distribution: L ∼ Weibull(Lmin, λ, k).
With λ, k, Lmin > 0, the support set is x ≥ Lmin
and the density is given by
pL(x) =
k
λ
(
x− Lmin
λ
)k−1
e
−
(
x−Lmin
λ
)
k
.
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FIG. 1. The breakdown of the system is demonstrated, where
L1, . . . , LN are drawn from a Pareto distribution with b = 2,
Lmin = 10. We also have S = 0.7L so that S1, . . . , SN are such
that Si = 0.7Li. We plot the ratio of surviving lines n∞(p, ε)
as a function of the attack size p for various ε values.
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FIG. 2. In the setting of Fig. 1, we plot the relative final size
n∞(p, ε) as a function of the loss/absorption factor parameter
ε for different attack sizes p.
The case k = 1 corresponds to the exponential
distribution, and k = 2 corresponds to Rayleigh
distribution. The mean load is given by E [L] =
Lmin + λΓ(1 + 1/k), where Γ(·) is the gamma-
function Γ(x) =
∫∞
0 t
x−1e−tdt.
Next, we confirm our results presented in Section III
concerning the response of the system to attacks of vary-
ing sizes; i.e., concerning the final system size n∞(p, ε).
We are particularly interested in the transition behav-
ior around the critical attack size p⋆. In all simulations,
we fix the number of lines at N = 106, and for each
set of parameters being considered (e.g., the distribution
pLS(x, y) and attack size p) we run 200 independent ex-
periments. In all figures below, the symbols represent the
empirical value of the final system size n∞(p, ε) (obtained
from simulations by averaging over 200 independent runs
for each data point), and solid lines represent the analytic
results computed from (8) with Qt⋆ obtained by iterat-
ing (7) while checking the condition (5) at each iteration
step.
We start our numerical results with Pareto distribu-
tion. In Figs. 1 - 2, we let L1, . . . , LN be drawn from
Pareto distribution with b = 2, Lmin = 10 and S = 0.7L.
In Fig. 1, we plot the ratio of surviving lines n∞(p, ε)
as a function of the attack size p for various ε values.
We already know from the analysis in [3] that for ε = 0,
Pareto distribution always fosters an abrupt first-order
transition behavior at p⋆. We observe that this first or-
der transition behavior continues to hold as ε is increased
from 0 to 0.8. In fact, up until that point, the system’s
ability to absorb ε-fraction of the failed load at each stage
does not affect the final system size n∞(p, ε). Only af-
ter ε = 0.8 the behavior of n∞(p, ε) starts to change as
shown in Fig. 1. For a complementary visualization, we
plot the behavior of the ratio of surviving node n∞(p, ε)
as a function of ε for different values of initial attack size
p. We see that the transition no longer fosters any sharp
behavior and continuously improves as it reaches ε = 1.
We next provide the mathematical justification for this
observation.
When ε = 1, an overloaded line will be removed from
the system without its load being redistributed to the re-
maining lines. Put differently, the only time redistribu-
tion will take place is stage 1, where Q0 gets redistributed
to each of the (1−p)N lines that have not been attacked.
Therefore, a line that is not in the initial attack will be
included in the final system size as long as its free-space
is larger than Q0. This leads to having
n∞(p, ε) = (1− p)P [S > Q0] (11)
where Q0 =
p
1−pE [L]. Therefore, n∞(p, ε) is continuous
in p whenever the marginal distribution of S is continu-
ous, a condition satisfied in all distributions considered
in the numerical results. Therefore, in the case of per-
fect ε, n(p, ε) hits zero and the system fully collapses in
a continuous fashion. We further note that the distribu-
tion of S under fixed E [L] and E [S] can be selected so
that the critical attack size p⋆ can be made arbitrarily
close to 1. Selecting S as a binary random variable at
{s1, s2} with s1 < E [S] < s2 independent from L such
that p1s1 + p2s2 = E [S] is sufficient to see this phe-
nomenon. For fixed s1 < E [S], one can select s2 arbi-
trarily large with p1, p2 6= 0 such that p1s1+p2s2 = E [S]
and this proves that P [S > Q0] can be made non-zero
irrespective of the value of the initial attack size p, i.e.,
p⋆ can be made arbitrarily close to 1.
In Fig. 3, we plot the ratio of surviving lines n∞(p, ε)
with respect to p when L1, . . . , LN are drawn from the
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FIG. 3. The breakdown of the system is demonstrated, where
L1, . . . , LN are drawn independently from a uniform distribu-
tion with Lmin = 10 and E[L] = 20, and S1, . . . , SN are drawn
independently from a uniform distribution with Smin = 10
and E [S] = 35. We plot the relative final size n∞(p, ε) as a
function of the attack size p for different ε.
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FIG. 4. The breakdown of the system is demonstrated, where
L1, . . . , LN are drawn from a Weibull distribution with k =
0.4, λ = 100, Lmin = 10, and free-space for each lines is given
by S = 1.74L. We plot the ratio of surviving lines n∞(p, ε)
as a function of the attack size p.
load L and extra space S is independent and uniformly
distributed with Lmin = Smin = 10 and E[L] = 20 and
E [S] = 35. We observe that the transition behavior
has a failure with preceding divergence and the critical
threshold p⋆ migrates from p⋆(ε) = 0.375 at ε = 0 to
p⋆(ε) = 0.75.
In Fig. 4, we plot the ratio of surviving lines n∞(p, ε)
with respect to p when L1, . . . , LN are drawn from
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FIG. 5. The phase diagrams and the resulting tricritical be-
havior is shown for Cases 1, 2 and 3. For each value of the
loss/absorption factor ε, we show the corresponding critical
attack size p. Solid curves represent cases where the transition
at the corresponding critical attack size is first-order, while
dashed curves stand for cases where a second-order phase
transition occurs.
Weibull distribution with k = 0.4, λ = 100, Lmin = 10,
S = 1.74L. We see that the Weibull distribution gives
rise to a richer set of possibilities for the transition of
n∞(p, ε). Namely, we see that an abrupt rupture, a rup-
ture with preceding divergence as well as a first-order
transition followed by a second-order transition that is
followed by an ultimate first-order breakdown are all pos-
sible in this case. As the parameter ε is increased, the
transition behavior gets smoother.
We finally examine the phase diagrams correspond-
ing to cases presented above and reveal the emergence
of tricritical points. In Fig. 5, we plot the loss factor
ε and attack size p pairs for which the phase transi-
tion occurs in either first or second order. We denote
a first order transition by straight line and a second or-
der transition by dashed line. In Fig. 5, we refer to
the case of L ∼ Pareto(2,10) and S = 0.7L as Case 1,
the case of independent L, S with L ∼ Uniform([10,30])
and S ∼ Uniform([10,60]) as Case 2 and the case of
L ∼ Weibull(10,100,0.4) and S = 1.74L as Case 3. We
observe that Case 1 fosters a very sharp phase diagram
in that a first-order phase transition occurs at the same
attack size for all loss factors smaller than a certain ε
value, and a second-order transition is seen after that ε
is exceeded. In contrast, Case 3 has a smoother phase
diagram as the phase transition switches from first order
to second order after a certain tricritical point [6]. We
also observe that the transition in Case 2 is always of first
order and the corresponding phase diagram is smooth.
8V. OPTIMIZING ROBUSTNESS
A. Quantifying robustness
A typical metric to assess network robustness is the
percolation threshold p⋆ at which the system fully col-
lapses as a result of the cascading failures [3, 42]. In
particular, we know from earlier works [3, 42] that for
ε = 0, p⋆optimal =
E[S]
E[S]+E[L] and it is achieved by a Dirac
delta distribution at E [S]. We observed in the numerical
results in Section IV that the presence of the parameter
ε changes p⋆. For example, we have seen that if more
load is absorbed from the overloaded lines by increasing
ε, p⋆ may increase or decrease with respect to the case
ε = 0. In cases when p⋆ increases n∞(p, ε) decreases. It
is, therefore, difficult to asses the robustness using only
the p⋆ metric; e.g., see Fig. 6 where the distribution that
leads to the highest p⋆ does not maximize the final system
size n∞(p, ε) uniformly across all attack sizes 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
In order to quantify the overall robustness of the net-
work under all possible attack sizes, we consider a metric
that measures the area under n∞(p, ε) over 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Namely, we let
R(ε) =
∫ 1
0
n∞(p, ε)dp. (12)
The metric R(ε) was introduced in [31], and can be seen
[43] to represent the expected final system size in response
to an attack whose size p is selected uniformly at random
over [0, 1]. It is in this spirit that the metric R(ε) quanti-
fies the overall system robustness under a range of attack
sizes for fixed ε. Alternative metrics can also be defined
where the attack size p is drawn from an arbitrary dis-
tribution F (p), e.g., to account for the fact that attacks
of certain size might be more likely than others. In that
case, we would again compute the mean of the final sys-
tem size, i.e.,
Ep [n∞(p, ε)] =
∫ 1
0
n∞(p, ε)dF (p) (13)
Clearly, R(ε) defined in (12) is recovered when F (p) is
the uniform distribution over [0, 1].
B. Maximizing the robustness metric R(ε)
Our next result conclusively establishes that for any
ε, the Dirac delta distribution [44] for free-space S op-
timizes the robustness of the system with respect to the
metric R(ε) among all possible distributions PLS(x, y)
with fixed E [S] and E [L]. First, we note that if
pLS(x, y) = pL(x)δ(y−E [S]), then the final system size is
independent of ε. This is because after the initial attack,
either all lines will fail (if E [S] ≤ pE [L] /(1−p)), or they
will all survive and the cascades will not continue. Thus,
the final system size under the Dirac-delta distribution
of free-space is given [42] by
nδ,∞(p) =
{
1− p if p < p⋆δ
0 if p ≥ p⋆δ
(14)
where, the critical attack size p⋆δ is given by
p⋆δ =
E[S]
E[S] + E[L]
.
We will show that the distribution pLS(x, y) =
pL(x)δ(y − E [S]) maximizes the robustness metric R(ε)
among all pLS with mean values for L and S fixed at
E [L] and E [S], respectively. In view of (14), this will
follow if we show that
∫ 1
0
n∞(p, ε, pLS)dp ≤
∫ p⋆
δ
0
(1− p)dp (15)
where n∞(p, ε, pLS(x, y)) denotes the final system size
under attack size p, when load and free-space values of
the lines are generated independently from the distribu-
tion pLS(x, y) (with fixed E [L], E [S]).
From (8) we note that
n∞(p, ε, pLS(x, y)) ≤ (1 − p)P [S ≥ Q0]
= (1 − p)P
[
S ≥
p
1− p
E [L]
]
, (16)
due to the fact that Q0 ≤ Qt for all t = 1, 2, . . .. There-
fore, we will get the desired result (15) if we show that
∫ 1
0
(1 − p)P
[
S ≥
p
1− p
E [L]
]
dp ≤
∫ p⋆
δ
0
(1 − p)dp,
or, equivalently that
∫ 1
p⋆
δ
(1− p)P
[
S ≥
p
1− p
E [L]
]
dp
≤
∫ p⋆
δ
0
(1− p)P
[
S <
p
1− p
E [L]
]
dp, (17)
Since 1 − p is monotone decreasing over the range 0 ≤
p ≤ 1, and both P
[
S ≥ p1−pE [L]
]
and P
[
S < p1−pE [L]
]
are non-negative, (17) will follow if we show that
∫ 1
p⋆
δ
P
[
S ≥
p
1− p
E [L]
]
dp ≤
∫ p⋆
δ
0
P
[
S <
p
1− p
E [L]
]
dp,
or, equivalently that
∫ 1
0
P
[
S ≥
p
1− p
E [L]
]
dp ≤
∫ p⋆
δ
0
dp =
E [S]
E [S] + E [L]
,
(18)
9In order to establish (18), we make a change of vari-
ables x = p1−pE [L] and write
∫ 1
0
P
[
S ≥
p
1− p
E [L]
]
dp
=
∫ ∞
0
P [S ≥ x] d
(
x
x+ E [L]
)
(19)
= P [S ≥ x]
x
x+ E [L]
∣∣∞
x=0
−
∫ ∞
0
x
x+ E [L]
d(P [S ≥ x])
= E
[
S
S + E [L]
]
≤
E [S]
E [S] + E [L]
(20)
where we use integration by parts in (19) and apply
Jensen’s inequality in (20) for the function x
x+E[L] that is
concave in x. This establishes (18) and the desired result
(15) follows in view of the preceding arguments.
This result shows that the system’s robustness with
respect to the metric R(ε) (defined at (12)) is maximized
under the constraints of fixed E [L] and fixed E [S] (and
hence fixed E [C]), by giving each line an equal free-space
E [S], irrespective of how the initial loads are distributed
and the redistribution process in the later stages. In other
words, the robustness is maximized by choosing a line’s
capacity Ci through Ci = Li + E [S] no matter what its
load Li is.
Note that in light of the results in Section IV, the criti-
cal attack size p⋆(ε) may be greater or less than E[S]
E[S]+E[L]
depending on the specific distribution pLS used (with
fixed E [L] and E [S]). In particular, we have seen that it
is always possible to choose a marginal distribution with
E [S] such that p⋆ is arbitrarily close to 1. Therefore,
one might think that the area under n∞(p, ε) while swip-
ing all possible p will be maximized when ε is increased
and the system has the capability to absorb the extra
load coming from the failing lines and eradicate the po-
tentially detrimental effect of their failure to the overall
system. Our result shows firmly that this intuition is in-
correct and the metric R(ε) is instead maximized when
the distribution of S is the Dirac delta function centered
at E [S] (irrespective of ε and the distribution of L).
We note that our argument follows from the facts that
the extra load due to the initial attack Q0 =
p
1−pE [L] is
monotone increasing, continuous, and convex in the ini-
tial attack size p. These properties are expected to hold
in a large set of instances of this problem. Therefore, the
optimality of the Dirac-delta distribution of S is likely
to hold under more general cases where these properties
hold. For instance, if the prior randomness F (p) on the
attack size p in (13) has a monotone decreasing deriva-
tive, i.e., if higher attack sizes are less likely, then the
Dirac-delta distribution of free-space S is still optimal
with respect to the resulting metric in (13). Such cases
occur in situations where the malicious attacker is more
likely to choose smaller attack sizes due to resource or
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FIG. 6. We plot the ratio of surviving lines n∞(p, ε) as a
function of the attack size p in the setting when L and S
are independent and distributed uniformly as U [0, 120] and
U [10, 60], respectively, as well as the setting when S is Dirac
delta distributed as δ(x− E [S]).
time constraints. We similarly observe that if the support
of the prior distribution of p is contained in the interval
[0, E[S]
E[S]+E[L] ], then the Dirac-delta function at E [S] is op-
timal with respect to R(ε). Finally, the optimality of the
Dirac-delta distribution of S (in the sense of maximizing
R(ε)) holds irrespective of the value of ε. As such, this
optimality prevails under any time variation in ε or pos-
sible dependence of ε on the instantaneous extra load per
line Qt.
While it is hard to generalize the optimality of Dirac
delta function for 0 < ε < 1 and any prior distribution
on p, we observe that if p is deterministic and ε = 1, then
the robustness metric in (13) is given by
Ep [n∞(p, ε)] = n∞(p, 1) = (1− p)P [S > Q0] . (21)
Then, in order to maximize n∞(p, ε), it suffices to min-
imize P [S > Q0] = P [S > pE [L] /(1− p)] subject to
E [S] being fixed. If the known attack size satisfies
p ≤ E[S]
E[S]+E[L] , then this is achieved when the distribution
of S is given by the Dirac-delta function centered at E [S].
If, on the other hand, we have p > E[S]
E[S]+E[L] , then the op-
timal distribution of S consists of two Dirac delta func-
tions centered at 0 and p1−pE [L], respectively, with ap-
propriate probabilities selected such that the mean value
is E [S]. In other words, if the attack size is larger than
what can be resisted by giving each line an equal amount
E [S] of free-space, then it is optimal to give a fraction of
lines zero free-space, while giving each of the other lines
an equal amount of p1−pE [L] free-space; i.e., just enough
so that they can handle the additional load of Q0 that
will be distributed to them after the attack.
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FIG. 7. L1, . . . , LN are drawn from Weibull distribution with
Lmin = 1 and k, λ such that E [L] = 2 and S = 1.74L. We
plot the metric R(ε) in (12) as a function of the parameter k.
C. Simulations with synthetic and real-world data
In Fig. 6, we plot the fraction of surviving lines
n∞(p, ε) as a function of the attack size p for several ε
values, in the setting when L and S are independent and
uniformly distributed as U [0, 120] and U [10, 60], respec-
tively. We compare the corresponding final system size
n∞(p, ε) when S is Dirac delta distributed as δ(x−E [S]).
We observe that the area under n∞(p, ε) is larger under
the Dirac delta distribution compared to other cases. In
Fig. 7, we provide a comparison of the metric R(ε) for a
family of Weibull distributions with fixed E [L] and E [S]
while varying the scale parameter k of the distribution.
We observe that R(ε) is monotone increasing in k and
is maximized in the limiting case k →∞. This observa-
tion is in perfect agreement with our result given that the
Weibull distribution approaches to a Dirac delta function
as k goes to infinity.
We now test our analytic results concerning the opti-
mization of robustness on real-world power system data
from the UK National Grid [36]. In particular, we pick
N = 75 loads L1, . . . , L75 from the Great Britain two de-
gree power flow diagram for 2017/18 shown explicitly in
Figure C.1 in [36, Appendix C]. These power flows rep-
resent the power units in MVA that flow through lines in
the utility grid in the scale shown in [36, Appendix C].
Our goal is to compare the robustness of this power
system, as quantified through the area metric, under dif-
ferent allocations of line capacities. In particular, we will
compare the performance of the equal free-space alloca-
tion with respect to the schemes described below:
• Proportional free-space allocation: For each line i,
we set Si = αLi, where α is the tolerance factor,
set to be the same across all N lines.
• Equal capacity allocation: Si + Li = C for all i if
Li < C and Si = 0 otherwise.
In order for this comparison to be fair, the total free-
space available to all 75 lines will be fixed; since loads
are already given from the UK Power-grid data set, this
will amount to having the total capacity of 75 lines fixed.
The total load of the 75 lines given in this data set is
60221 power units. We assume that a total free-space
of 168620 power units is available to these lines and will
be allocated according to one of three free-space alloca-
tion schemes to be considered. For the proportional free-
space allocation, this leads to using a tolerance-factor of
α = 2.8 for all lines, while for the equal capacity alloca-
tion scheme, this leads to fixing the capacity of all lines at
C = 3051 power units. In the case of equal free-space al-
location, this amounts to assigning the capacity of every
line at their load plus 168620/75 ≃ 2248 units of free-
space. These three schemes are compared with respect
to the resulting area robustness metric defined here as
R(ε) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
n∞(pi, ε) (22)
where pi =
i
N
.
The results are presented in Fig. 8, where each data
point corresponds to the average over 5000 independent
experiments. We observe that the equal free-space alloca-
tion performs significantly better than the other two ca-
pacity allocation schemes, in the sense leading to a larger
value of the robustness metric (22). For instance, when a
random attack occurs whose scale p is selected uniformly
at random from (0, 1), we see that close to 50% of the
lines are expected to survive under the optimal choice of
equal free-space allocation. We remind that under (22),
the metric R(ε) is always less than 0.5, meaning that the
performance under the equal free-space allocation is close
to the theoretically possible maximum robustness level.
This statement holds irrespective of the absorption factor
ε and in particular even if the system has no capability of
absorbing the failed load. However, if we use the widely
assumed setting of free-space being proportional to load,
i.e., Ci = (1 + α)Li, then we can expect only about 35%
of the nodes to survive the same scenario if the system
has no load absorption capability. We see that even if
the system is designed with full load absorption capabil-
ity (i.e., ε = 1), the expected number of surviving nodes
increases only to about 41%, still worse than the optimal
case. The equal-capacity allocation leads to a higher ro-
bustness than the proportional free-space case, but the
achieved robustness is still inferior to the case of where all
lines have the same free-space. It is only when the system
has almost perfect flow absorption capability (i.e., ε = 1)
that the performances of equal-capacity and equal free-
space allocations become similar; for small ε we see that
equal free-space is significantly better. Although not re-
ported here for brevity, our extensive simulation results
indicate that similar conclusions apply for a wide range
of α and C values.
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FIG. 8. Comparison of robustness performances of equal free-
space allocation, equal capacity allocation and proportional
free-space allocation for N = 75 lines with load data obtained
from the UK National Grid [36, Appendix C]. We observe
that the robustness is better for equal free-space allocation
with respect to the other two benchmarks.
D. Simulations under a topology-based
redistribution model
The results presented in earlier sections of this paper
were based on a model with a mean field assumption in
that when a line fails, its load gets redistributed glob-
ally and equally among all active lines in the network.
This mean field assumption may not hold for networks
with possible local redistribution behavior such as power
networks. On the other hand, it is well known that re-
distribution models with only local components fail to
capture the long-range nature of Kirchhoffs Law. Con-
sequently, a model where the failed load is redistributed
both locally and globally would be a more suitable one.
To this end, we present in this section simulation results
under a topology based redistribution model. We do so
with an eye towards revealing whether the optimality of
equal free-space distribution prevails when failed load is
redistributed (at least in part) locally according to a net-
work topology.
In the spirit of the redistribution models presented
in [32, 34], we consider a topology based redistribution
model that combines local and global redistribution be-
haviors. This extended model gauges the locality of
the redistribution by the parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] and the
network topology is generated as an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph
G(n,N). At each stage, the portion of the load that
is not absorbed from each failed line is divided into two
parts: γ-fraction is redistributed locally among neighbor-
ing lines (with each neighbor receiving an equal portion),
and (1 − γ)-fraction is redistributed equally among all
surviving lines (irrespective of topology). In this model,
setting γ = 0 recovers the mean-field model introduced
in Section II, while setting γ = 1 gives a merely topology
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FIG. 9. We let L1, . . . , LN be obtained from Weibull dis-
tribution with Lmin = 1 and k, λ such that E [L] = 2 and
S = 1.74L. For (a) γ = 0.25, (b) γ = 0.6, and (c) γ = 1.0,
the plots show the variation of the metric R(ε) in (22) with
the parameter k for various ε values.
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based redistribution model.
For this new redistribution model, we have run simu-
lations where we set the number of nodes as n = 250 and
number of edges as N = 8400, and created a random net-
work according to the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi G(n,N) model. This
leads to each line having on average 132 neighbors. The
loads {L1, . . . , LN} are drawn from i.i.d. Weibull dis-
tribution (with Lmin = 1 and k, λ such that E [L] = 2)
and the free spaces are set as Si = 1.74Li. We run 100
independent experiments for each parameter set, and re-
port the average value of the robustness metric defined
in (22).
The results are presented in Fig. 9(a), Fig. 9(b) and
Fig. 9(c) for γ = 0.25, γ = 0.6 and γ = 1, respec-
tively; we remark that the setting in Fig. 7 corresponds
to the case with γ = 0. The most important observation
is that Figs. 9(a)-9(c) obtained under (partially) local
load redistribution are qualitatively the same with the
results given in Fig. 7 obtained under mean-field analy-
sis (i.e., global redistribution). For instance, we observe
in all figures that as the parameter k is increased, the
robustness of the network increases monotonically with
Dirac-delta distribution of free-space S leading the max-
imum robustness. Thus, we conclude that the optimality
of equal free-space allocation prevails even when the re-
distribution of the loads on failing lines are performed
based on the topology of the network. Another observa-
tion we make from Figs. 9(a), 9(b) and 9(c) with compar-
ison to Fig. 7 is that increasing the locality parameter γ
decreases robustness. This is in line with our understand-
ing that introducing heterogeneity in the redistribution
model causes further loss in robustness.
We finally test the effect of node degree on the ro-
bustness of the network. We consider the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
G(n,N) model with the same number of nodes n = 250
and a significantly smaller number of edges N = 625.
In this case, each line has 8 neighbors on average. The
results are presented in Fig. 10(a), Fig. 10(b) and Fig.
10(c) for γ = 0.25, γ = 0.6 and γ = 1, respectively. We
observe the same qualitative behaviour in Fig. 9 in that
as the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution gets
larger, the robustness of the network improves irrespec-
tive of locality parameter γ and the absorption parame-
ter ǫ. Additionally, we observe that robustness is affected
by the connectivity of the network in different ways for
different γ and ǫ. In particular, robustness significantly
drops as the average number of neighbors decreases when
ǫ is smaller while the effect of the number of neighbors on
robustness is limited for higher ǫ. This numerical obser-
vation points to an intricate relation among load absorp-
tion, the average number of neighbors and locality in the
load redistribution process for their effects on survival
and robustness against cascading failures. Overall, the
numerical results in Figs. 9 and 10 confirm the promise
of uniformly allocating the free spaces to each node and
gives reason to extend our results to more general net-
work and redistribution models [45].
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FIG. 10. We repeat the experiments in Fig. 9 for (a) γ = 0.25,
(b) γ = 0.6, and (c) γ = 1.0, under a different Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
graph with significantly smaller average number of neighbors.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We studied the robustness of flow networks consisting
of N lines against random attacks under a partial load
redistribution model. In particular, when a line fails due
to overloading, it is removed from the system and (1−ε)-
fraction of the load it was carrying gets redistributed
equally among all remaining lines while the remaining
ε-fraction is assumed to be lost or absorbed. We derive
recursive relations describing the dynamics of cascading
failures for any attack size p, and identify the final frac-
tion of surviving lines when the cascades stop. These
findings are confirmed via extensive simulations. Among
other things, we show that unlike the full redistribution
case (i.e., ε = 0), partial redistribution might lead to the
order of transition at the critical attack size p⋆ changing
from first to second-order, and a tricritical point emerges
with respect to attack size p and absorption/loss factor
ε.
One of the most interesting findings of this paper is
concerned with how system robustness can be maximized
by properly choosing the distribution pLS that generates
the initial load and free-space values of each line. We con-
sider this problem when the mean load E[L] and mean
free-space E[S] are fixed. First, we show that unlike the
full redistribution case (i.e., when ε = 0), the critical
attack size p⋆ is not necessarily maximized by assigning
every line the same free-space E [S]; depending on the
fraction ε of the load that is absorbed at each stage, we
see that distributions other than Dirac-delta for S may
lead to higher critical points p⋆. Next, we consider the ro-
bustness metric proposed in [31] that computes the area
under the final system size n∞(p, ε) over all possible at-
tack sizes 0 ≤ p ≤ 1; this amounts to computing the
average response of the network to initial attacks of dif-
ferent size. We show that the system is most robust in the
sense that the area metric is maximized, when the varia-
tion among the free-space of lines is minimized. In other
words, the Dirac- delta distribution of free-space leads to
the optimum robustness, irrespective of ε and how load L
is distributed. Additionally, we test the robustness per-
formance with respect to this area metric in finite flow
networks with load data obtained from a real power net-
work. We observe that allocating the free-space equally
among the lines yields significantly higher performance
when compared to well-known benchmarks despite the
small size chosen for the network. Finally, we tested this
robustness result in an extended topology-based redistri-
bution model over an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph and we observed
that uniformly allocating free-spaces promises to be op-
timal in this more general setting as well.
There are many open problems one can consider for fu-
ture work. For instance, the analysis can be extended to
the case where the redistribution parameter ε is not the
same for all lines, but follows a given probability distri-
bution. Similarly, ε could be a time-varying parameter or
it could depend on the extra load per line in the current
stage. Such possibilities would allow us to obtain further
understanding on the dynamical properties of the cas-
cading failures and the mechanisms that could lead to a
smooth failure. Additionally, it would be interesting to
see if the robustness is still maximized with a Dirac delta
type distribution on the free-space under various combi-
nations of possibilities on ε. Variability in the redistri-
bution as in [46] and stochastic behaviour in the loads
as in [47] also constitute interesting avenues for future
research. In light of these directions, we will investigate
relations among ε, the average number of neighbors and
locality in redistribution for their effects on robustness
against cascading failures. Finally, it would be inter-
esting to study the partial redistribution model under
targeted attacks rather than random failures.
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